Sergey Gnatyuk * Informational and Psychological Component of Russian Aggression against Ukraine: Technologies of Media Influences, Opportunities and Countermeasures (ATO Zone)


For about last decade, Russia managed to create a state-controlled media platform that consists of a number of federal broadcasters and powerful foreign broadcasting system. The main ones are: the All-Russian Governmental TV and Broadcasting Company (VGTRK), Gazprom-Media Holding public corporation, "National Media Group (NMG) joint-stock company. In addition, Russia has a centralized governmental system of international broadcasting, which as of 2016, included the Federal unitary enterprise of International Information Agency "Russia Today" (earlier - RIA Novosti),  Sputnik multimedia service (earlier - Moscow Radio and Voice of Russia Radio ) and International information TV company RT (formerly - Russia Today). Broadcasting services have always received generous government funding, but in 2013-2015 it abruptly increased.

Thus, in 2014 the "Russia Today" agency received 2.67 billion rubles from the federal budget, and in 2015 6.48 billion rubles were allocated for its maintenance.¹ Since 2016 the Kremlin has been forced to slightly reduce government funding of media under its control, but these costs clearly remain a priority for it.

Today, Russia has one of the largest and most powerful media capacities in the world, first and foremost in TV and radio broadcasting. Now the media cluster controlled by the Kremlin: a) has significant financial resources, allowing it to operate in general at the level of international quality standards; b) has a significant global coverage and global audience, including the EU and the US; c) has extensive experience and capabilities for the production and distribution of high quality propaganda content,holding efficient campaigns of disinformation, defamation, correction of public opinion, etc.; d) at the moment is almost completely controlled by the political leadership of the state. All this makes the Russian media powerful and reliable tool for the implementation of information and psychological operations of fairly wide spectrum.

Moreover, the Russian service of information and psychological operations (PsO) and governmental media have been able to quite efficiently use the lessons of  their failure during the Georgian media campaign of 2008-2009², having upgraded the organization, methods of operation and technologies of influence. This is evidenced by a significant destabilizing effect on their part on political circles and public opinion of the EU (which prompted the European Commission, and governments of a number of countries of the Union - Germany, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, the Baltic States – to urgently seek ways and tools for countering Russian propaganda)³.

Besides, we must recognize extremely high efficiency of media support of the Russian occupation of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea and  expanding military operations in Ukraine. It included not only a wide range of PsO for very different audiences (from Russian and Ukrainian to international), but the introduction of special broadcasting in the occupied regions of Ukraine. And if there was no considerable success at the international level in 2014, then at the local level - quite opposite. The enemy managed to completely disorient the population in the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea and certain regions of Donetsk and Luhansk Provinces (ORDLO) in 2014, thus ensuring success (in the Crimea - also minimization)  of the armed invasion, and later - to establish here almost absolute informational monopoly.

The facts show that on-air and cable TV continue to be the main media source of information about the internal and external situation for the population of Ukraine. The same applies to the occupied Crimea, and even more - the South-East of the country, including its uncontrolled area: according to the surveys, 83% of the population of the region traditionally receive news from television. Second and third places are taken with a considerable margin by internet media (41% make up audience of online sources) and relatives, friends and neighbours (24% receive information from them)⁴.

Waging the so-called "Hybrid war" against Ukraine, the relevant agencies and organizations of Russia apparently took that into account and defined the sector of TV broadcasting as the main channel of misinformation, propaganda, and other destructive information impacts. The key element of strategies of social and political destabilizations which were actively implemented by them especially in Ukraine in spring and summer of 2014, was the TV content distributed at the territory of the object of aggression, including usage of captured there facilities. Such attempts of media expansion failed in most regions of the country, but they were very successful at temporarily occupied area of "LPR-DPR".

At the beginning of the occupation the most powerful analogue TV broadcasting transmitters in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces and their highest points of suspension, located in Donetsk, Luhansk and Rovenky, were controlled by separatists, as well as governmental property, equipment and much of the staff of local broadcasters (TRO) and branches of RRT Concern. Local operators of cable channels also had to continue their work under occupation. This immediately gave the separatists decisive advantages in displacing the Ukrainian content from media market and establishing their own propaganda broadcasting.

Hence, capturing the TV centre of RRT Concern in Donetsk allowed DPR grouping to start retransmission of a package of prohibited by the Ukrainian law Russian programmes and local pro-Russian channels made by militants, instead of Ukrainian channels, both in analogue and digital format T2 (respectively 12 and 9 channels in late 2014). The signal from Donetsk tower covers a large part of the region, including unoccupied territories⁵.

The State TV and Radio Company of Lugansk People’s Republic was established in Luhansk back in 2014 at the logistical and partly personnel base of captured Luhansk Provincial State Broadcasting Company, Luhansk Cable Television company and Independent TV and Radio Company IRTA Ltd, which is actually broadcasting under the logo "Lugansk 24" on TV channel 2 (TVC), at the frequency of Studio1+1 Ltd. The content of programmes is anti-Ukrainian, they use materials of Russian broadcasters, broadcast films of the Soviet era, Russian TV series and action films, and video clips of "Chanson" format. Russian programmes "Russia 24" (6 TVC), «Life News» (TVC 26) and "Star" (TVC50) are also retransmitted in Luhansk. Terrorists carry out their own radio broadcasting in Luhansk at frequency 103.6 MHz (owned by radio "Pulse", Lugansk ODTRC Company). Programmes are filled up with news of the self-declared republic, "patriotic" songs, chanson⁶.

As of 2017, Russian and separatist audiovisual media continue to dominate in ORDLO (Separate Regions of Donetsk and Luhansk Provinces) with the minimum quantity of Ukrainian content. Moreover, some additional factors are still working against the Ukrainian side in the present media situation in the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine:

• the foundation for the active phase of information-and-psychological aggression against Ukrainian society had been laid already before 2014: in particular, secessionist and pro-Russian sentiments among the population of the South-East were formed in advance (which should be viewed as an integral part of the plan for invasion);

• specialized agencies and media organizations of the Russian Federation, in contrast to the Ukrainian ones, have extensive experience in psychological and information expansion similar to "Donbass" scenario (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, considerable experience of international broadcasting, i.e. working with other, "alien" audiences), developed technologies for the production of such content and PsO;

• target audiences were immediately offered a simple, attractive, well-articulated pseudo-ideological concepts by the Russian media ( "Donbass - the land of miners, breadwinner", "Russian World", "Novorossia"), image of the enemy ( "Kiev junta", "ukrofascists", " bEnderovtsy "), the second image (" Russia - liberator, assistant","Russian volunteer") and perspective (" Novorossia is a free and prosperous part of Russia "). It differed distinctly and still differs from the ambiguous, pluralistic, reflection and debate oriented Ukrainian media context;

• Ukrainian side, respectively, lost all of this resource; from the very beginning of the occupation the most powerful analogue TV broadcasting transmitters in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces and their highest points of suspension were controlled by separatists, as well as governmental property, equipment and much of the staff of local broadcasters (TRO) and branches of RRT Concern.

• population of uncontrollable and sometimes liberated territories for over three years has almost exclusively been in the focus of high-efficiency Russian propaganda.

According to sociological studies and measurement of domestic media audiences, the trend of 2015-2016 in Ukraine was ousting Russian sources from the media zone and steep decline in confidence in them by consumers, and most of all - in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Odessa and Mykolaiv provinces.⁷ʹ⁸ It would seem that this could create favourable conditions for the "counterattack" of national media aimed at implementation of basic information rights of citizens, humanization and consolidation of Ukrainian society throughout the state. However, the facts show that at the moment both the domestic media and journalistic community and the state are not ready enough for that.

According to the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine Ukrainian specialized agencies managed to restore national TRC broadcasting in general at the beginning of 2017 only at the controlled and liberated territories of Donetsk and Luhansk provinces and in the southern outskirts of Donetsk. As of June, Ukrainian broadcasters’ signal coverage in the two provinces as a whole increased by 27% in the delimitation line zone - by 70%, but still it is not aggregate even in the liberated areas. 29 analogue TV transmitters have been mounted, 34 FM-transmitters, 1 digital transmitter and 3 AM-transmitters⁹. All transmitters have not been funded from the budget, but due to the help of Ukrainian and foreign donors. A permanent TV tower 184 meters high has been functioning on the Karachun hill near the town of Slovyansk since December, works are continuing as for the installation of two more towers in the front-line zone¹⁰. Activities of Donetsk and Luhansk branches of KRRT and Provincial Governmental TRC have been restored in government-controlled areas, their broadcasting has been adjusted in cooperation with a number of regional TRO of other forms of property which left temporarily uncontrolled eastern territories. 180 sets of satellite television with Ukrainian broadcasting package have been installed at the ATO front-line zone (sectors A, B, C and M). Meanwhile, the Ukrainian signal is received only sporadically in the towns of the so called "gray zone" along the delimitation line, while broadcasting from "LPR-DPR" is received everywhere¹¹. Ukrainian national on-air broadcasters are still practically absent at the uncontrolled areas of ORDLO, which is confirmed by volunteers of NGO "Donetsk Institute of Information» (http://dii.dn.ua/), present in the area. After the commissioning of a new tower on the Karachun hill, at least 20% of the territory controlled by Ukraine in the area of ATO would still remain uncovered by the signal of national channels.¹²

One of the key reasons of such a minor progress (except for emergency conditions, lack of staff, resources, etc.) is extremely inefficient organization and coordination of efforts in renewing broadcasting in Donbas by relevant governmental agencies. Thus, the Interdepartmental Commission on ensuring the stable functioning of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting as a part of the Ministry of Informational Policy, which would have performed the function of, so to speak, consulting and conciliation ground and the centre of decision-making, has not got for this either sufficient authority and resources, or its own budget, or clear spheres of responsibility (competence). Its current administrative and legal status, allows it to produce only recommendations and draft legislation that do not oblige relevant agencies to fulfil them. In practice, this naturally creates a model of interagency cooperation, within which solving even relatively minor issues (such as installation and starting up another transmitter), makes the Commission spend several months to collect necessary "approvals" of relevant governmental agencies. In turn, this leads to a classic situation of "collective irresponsibility". In addition, any agency is able to block the implementation of even important positive decisions that was clearly shown by the situation with the construction of new TV towers (see above).

It is also quite obvious that the background for such an unsatisfactory governmental management in this segment is a deeper systemic problem and namely - the inadequacy of the current institutional model and regulatory support for public information policy and media supervision¹³. However reform of the model, adequate to the needs of Ukraine, requires a lot of additional conditions (more stable situation, resources, time) and is, at the best, a medium term issue. In the context of the renewal of Ukrainian broadcasting in ORDLO, it refers to the immediate implementation of a number of specific strategic tasks requiring more urgent regulatory approval and implementation of efficient algorithms and coordination of efforts of relevant government agencies as for their accomplishment.

Among the factors that lead to the low penetration dynamics of national broadcasting at the uncontrolled and occupied territories, is apparently insufficient  use of the potential of the cable (at least at the liberated territories) and satellite TV. Currently the main media source of information for citizens in the area of ATO is on-air TV, but as the head of Monitoring Mission of the Ministry of Informational Policy A. Bryhinets said, there is a significant resource of development for Ukrainian cable network providers in the government controlled area, and in addition, considerably popular throughout the territory of ATO is satellite TV¹⁴. According to various sources, now 20% to 50% of residents of temporarily uncontrolled eastern territories are able to watch Ukrainian television by satellite, despite the fact that about 30-40% watch analogue TV¹⁵. Besides, there is an international experience of successful application of satellite broadcasting in such situations. This applies, e.g., to Iraqi Alhurra and especially Belsat, whose headquarters are located in Poland, and they broadcast via satellite to the Republic of Belarus¹⁶. All this prompts a closer consideration of the possibility of distributing T2 tuners with a special Ukrainian broadcasting package to residents of uncontrolled and occupied areas.

Another key aspect of restoring national broadcasting in the zone of ATO and the Crimea is the problem of producing high quality content and adherence to journalistic standards. In turn, it is part of a broader issue of improving the national system of media production, mechanisms of self-regulation of journalistic community and training.

According to the media experts, Ukrainian journalism in general showing healthy trends in line with classic European standards, is still in the period of its formation, the most striking features of which are: lack of institutionalization of professional standards and regulations (lack of clear editorial policies); absence of efficient corporate codes, including - a code of journalist ethics; inefficient institutions of self-organization, lack of influential trade unions; often - insufficient professional level and general ignorance of journalists; relatively modest financial resources associated with excessive dependence on the current business situation and the interests of the owner; weak public broadcaster, unfinished reform of media¹⁷.

For instance, one of the national polls in 2016 showed that only a few national media journalists confidently formulated, what standards they must adhere to; the poll also showed that in many cases the standard were "subject to interpretation of journalists themselves", but not editorial regulations. There are no established "corporative" ethical rules – journalist takes decisions, based largely on the circumstances and "his/her own intuition" ¹⁸.

Research and measurements of the past two years have shown that the national media commonly use conflict vocabulary and language of enmity and hatred (hate speech), consciously or not Russian propaganda theses are spread around, division into "us" and "them" in society is cultivated, issues of volunteering and internally displaced persons are almost neglected, foci are made on describing conflict society issues and topics (but not on the ways of overcoming them), and "dirty" facts are mostly given priority over socially meaningful information¹⁹.

It should be admitted that during three years of hostilities and occupation most of national journalists failed to develop uniform rules and/or principles of professional activities in the conflict zone. All this makes vital further development of the mechanisms, institutions and practices of self-regulation of the Ukrainian journalist community.

There is very little content in the national broadcasting network aiming at the audience affected by hostilities and occupation despite the fact that an objective need for it in the society has increased dramatically since March, 2014. Paradoxically, equally little attention to this subject is paid by Ukrainian regional media operating in controlled and liberated territories: only 1% of the materials of local press is dedicated to the antiterrorist operation, 3% of the publications of local online media and 8% of stories of local TV (mostly - the servicemen, their return home). Donetsk media pay much less attention to settlers: 1% of the materials in print and online, 3% - on television. However, as of December 2015, there were about 64 thousand internally displaced persons only in Kramatorsk.²⁰

In this situation, even full restoration of national broadcasting in uncontrolled areas (i.e. their mere inclusion in the current all-Ukrainian media context) will not give the desired effect in terms of information and psychological rehabilitation and reintegration of the population of these territories. For this purpose, special TV and radio broadcasting space should be formed in the region.

Thus, one of the central issues that needs prompt and indispensable solution becomes systematic production and distribution of Ukrainian content designed specifically for ATO areas and the Crimea. The order to establish such broadcasting for the occupied territories the President of Ukraine gave to the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting in early July, 2014²¹. This fundamental problem is still not solved systematically at the level of state policy, and therefore - remains open, keeping in mind that a lot has already been done in this direction by the professional media, NGOs and civil journalists²².

Thus, the main causes for minor changes in the information confrontation with Russia at  uncontrolled and liberated territories of Ukraine are: 1) extremely inefficient organization and coordination of relevant government agencies as for renewing broadcasting in Donbas; 2) lack of a clear, conceptualized and adequate to the scale of the mission action plan, and associated with this fragmentation and obvious insufficiency of measures taken; 3) governmental broadcasters lack logistics, equipment, powerful enough transmitters, lack towers of the necessary height near ATO areas; 4) lack of government funding, bureaucratic obstacles, sabotage from the part of some officials and public employees; 5) insufficient quantity and quality of content required for special broadcasting; 6) inexperience and insufficient professional level of Ukrainian journalist community, the weakness of mechanisms and practices of its self-regulation; 7) presumably - insufficient use of the potential of cable and satellite channels to organize special broadcasting.

At the same time, because of "hybrid" Russian aggression in the domestic media, Ukraine has now faced with the need to solve three fundamental problems:

1. Neutralize the effects of Russian propaganda/misinformation on the target Ukrainian audience (and ideally - to provide the opposite effect by its exposing and reasonable discrediting).

2. Optimize Ukrainian national media discourse - at least in the government controlled areas. Despite numerous - sensible or not - reasons for public confrontation, the "mainstream" should be the subject and lexics of reconciliation, tolerance and the search for common values, senses, motivations.

3. Solve a complex of communicative and media problems linked with ORDLO as (a) a constant source of information reasons for propaganda of the enemy, (b) "headquarters" for a cluster of anti-Ukrainian media and journalists, (c) the residence of Ukrainian citizens the vast majority of which in the future will require information and psychological reintegration in the context of the life of the whole Ukraine.

Despite obvious interconnectedness and urgency of these tasks, each of them is a full-fledged way of long-term efforts, while a purpose and, at the same time, the most desirable condition for the success of this work is the final cessation of hostilities and restoration of the integrity of Ukraine. However, at the moment the situation is reverse: there is a need to operate with the account of the specific extreme circumstances of hybrid war, the deficit of relevant experience and thus - quickly, with the expectation of achieving a rapid effect.

With this in mind, it seems appropriate to focus in particular on the following areas:

Emergency development of medium-term (3-5 years) Strategy for recovery and protection of television and radio space of Ukraine * and its approval with the legal status of the Law of Ukraine. The document, in addition to determining the ultimate goal and the means to achieve it must сontain specified tasks and deadlines, the circle of agencies and organizations dealing with their implementation (local authorities, National Public TV&Radio Broadcasting Company of Ukraine (NSTU), relevant non-governmental organizations), clearly defined responsibilities, guidelines and algorithms of interaction. Besides south-eastern region of Ukraine, this strategy has to regulate relevant activities in other problem areas of the state, particularly on its south-western border and in Volyn, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kherson provinces and the occupied territories of the Crimea.

Reviewing (optimizing) the model of organization and coordination of relevant government agencies as for the restoration of the national broadcasting in Donbas, taking into account specific and strategic importance of this task. In particular, raising the efficiency of this model requires its centralization and minimization of bureaucratic procedures within its bounds. In this context, it is advisable to consider increasing the powers and responsibilities for specifically established body for interagency coordination, which is now the Interdepartmental Commission on ensuring the stable functioning of the National Television and Radio (functioning within Ministry of Informational Policy), including giving it a special status of subordination not to the minister, but directly to the Prime Minister, the First Deputy Prime Minister, Presidential Administration or the National Security Council of Ukraine.

Forming separate Donbas programmes edition (Working Group) as part of the National Public TV & Radio Broadcasting Company of Ukraine (NSTU) responsible for development of the concept of broadcasting, requirements for content taking into consideration specificity of the target audience, prepare proposals on management, personnel, logistics and institutional and organizational model for establishments of special broadcasting on the territories of Donbas.

Establishing on the legal and logistical base of Donetsk and Luhansk provincial governmental TRC a single public regional broadcasters (TRO) specifically designed for national broadcasting on temporarily occupied and adjacent territories. In case of positive decision, it should also be feasible to consult and negotiate with other regional TRO of other forms of ownership, Ukrainian and foreign broadcasters and NGOs as for cooperation and assistance in the exchange of content, staff, experience.

specialized governmental bodies and professional associations of media workers should hold joint consultations to develop a unified internal Code of principles and rules of journalism and coverage in the area of ATO. All the specifics of the situation must be taken into account, and in particular the following factors: a)  permanent need for neutralization of the Russian propaganda based on a rapid collection and dissemination of proven, accurate and meaningful information; b) importance of explaining the general principles of  policy and specific actions of the Ukrainian government; c) importance of satisfying the specific information and communication needs of the citizens that live in the ATO area; d) the need to respect the operational requirements for work with classified information in accordance with the recommendations of the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine).²⁴

For the development of corporate self-regulation, the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, National media trade union of Ukraine, the Commission on journalistic ethics and other core expert organizations are: 1) to develop general principles for the formation of editorial boards and statutes, raise the issue of their mandatory introduction (for those media, where there are editorial offices); 2) to provide regular monitoring to identify those specific media and journalists who violate journalistic standards and professional ethics with mandatory disclosure of the results of the monitoring and punishment of those responsible within the powers of these organizations.

Include relevant expenditures in the State Budget of Ukraine for 2018 with the allocation of these expenditures to categories protected under the second paragraph of Art. 55 of the Budget Code of Ukraine ("the measures related to strengthening defence capability").

Consider issuance of free T2 tuners with special settings (Ukrainian broadcasting package) to the citizens who come from time to time from uncontrolled territory to that controlled by the government.


1. http://www.rbc.ru/ins/technology_and_media/05/11/2014/54592396cbb20f2381c3e089

2. Манойло А. Война в Южной Осетии: психологическая обработка общественного мнения стран ЕС [Electronic resource]. - Access: http://www.politex.info/content/view/597/30/http://old.niss.gov.ua/Monitor/june2009/03.htm

3. In details see: Гнатюк С. Міжнародний досвід здійснення спеціальних режимів мовлення: висновки для України [Electronic resource]. -  Access: http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/specrezim-1161e.pdf

4. Протидія російській інформаційній агресії: спільні зусилля задля захисту демократії. .Аналітичний звіт. – К.: Телекритика, 2015. – p. 41 [Electronic resource]. - Access: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/30479341/Telekritika_analytics_propaganda_2015.pdf

5. Report of the representative of the National council of Ukraine for TV and Radio Broadcasting in Donetsk Province Myroslava Kaluzhna, 2014 [Electronic resource]. - Access: http://www.nrada.gov.ua/userfiles/file/2015/Zvitna%20informacia/Vzitu%20predstavnukiv/%D0%94%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%86%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B0.doc

6. Report of the representative of the National council of Ukraine for TV and Radio Broadcasting in Luhansk Province Andriy Privaltsev, 2014 [Electronic resource]. - Access: http://www.nrada.gov.ua/userfiles/file/2015/Zvitna%20informacia/Vzitu%20predstavnukiv/%D0%9B%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B0.rar

7. The given data correspond only to the controlled territories of Ukraine.

8. http://detector.media/infospace/article/113397/mediaspozhivannia_ta_dovira_do_zmi_na_donbasi_doslidzhennia_internews/

9. Передатчики должны быть все мощнее, а вышки - все выше» // https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4kE2jwzFXok

10. http://mip.gov.ua/files/Presentation/_MIP_2016_Year_04-01.pdf

11. Report on renewal of broadcasting in ANO zone (June, 2016) // http://mip.gov.ua/files/documents/Plan_diyalnosti_MIP_na_2016_1.pdf; Analysis of the activities of the Ministry of Informational Policy of Ukraine, 3rd quarter, 2016 (July -   September)// http://mip.gov.ua/files/pdf/MIP_2016_Third_quartal_004.compressed.pdf Чи вистоять «інформаційні бастіони»? // http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/media/chy-vystoyat-informaciyni-bastiony

12. See in details: Стан та проблеми забезпечення державної інформаційної політики: зона проведення АТО та окуповані території: аналіт. доп. / за заг. ред. Д. Дубова – К. : НІСД, 2016. p.p. 44-47 [Еlectronic resource]. - Access : http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/AD_InfoStrat-8505e.pdf

13. The fact that the thesis is true has been proven again by the materials of a voluminous report recently drafted by experts of the Council of Europe and published in September, 2016. (See: Report on the analysis of distribution of powers of governmental agencies in the sphere of informational policy and media in Ukraine/Council of Europe. Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law.// https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806a950a)

14. МІП: в прифронтовій зоні крім ефірного мовлення потрібно розвивати кабельну мережу // http://mip.gov.ua/news/1282.html

15. На конференції МІП презентували кроки з інформаційної реінтеграції Сходу України та Криму //  http://bryhynets.com/index.php?nma=news&fla=stat&nums=6723&cat_id=1&page=; Недосяжні висоти. Як на Донбасі відновлюють українське мовлення // http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/10/25/7124717/

16. In detail see: Стан та проблеми забезпечення державної інформаційної політики: зона проведення АТО та окуповані території: аналіт. доп. / за заг. ред. Д. Дубова – К. : НІСД, 2016. p. 65-66 [Еlectronic resource]. - Access: http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/AD_InfoStrat-8505e.pdf

17. http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/content/files/telekritika_self-regulation_2015_light_2.pdf

18. http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/content/files/special_report_overcoming_barriers_media_in_covering_conflict-sensitive_issues_ukr.pdf

19. http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/content/files/special_report_overcoming_barriers_media_in_covering_conflict-sensitive_issues_ukr.pdf http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/content/files/telekritika_self-regulation_2015_light_2.pdf http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/mediaprosvita/research/ukrainski_regionalni_media_nedostatno_informuyut_suspilstvo_pro_pereselentsiv_doslidzhennya/ http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/mediaprosvita/research/tsentr_sotsialna_diya_zafiksuvav_424_vipadki_vzhivannya_movi_vorozhnechi_v_ukrainskikh_zmi_za_2014_rik/

20. Медіаландшафт на українських та окупованих територіях Донбасу: дослідження GFK та ІМІ // http://detector.media/infospace/article/113435/medialandshaft_na_ukrayinskih_ta_okupovanih_teritoriiah_donbasu_doslidzhennia_gfk_ta_imi/

21. Порошенко доручив розробити спеціальне мовлення для Донбасу // http://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3389277-poroshenko-doruchyv-rozrobyty-spetsialne-movlennia-dlia-donbasu

22. In details see: Стан та проблеми забезпечення державної інформаційної політики: зона проведення АТО та окуповані території: аналіт. доп. / за заг. ред. Д. Дубова – К. : НІСД, 2016. p. 53-57 [Еlectronic resource]. - Access : http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/AD_InfoStrat-8505e.pdf

23. Besides the south-eastern region of Ukraine the strategy is to regulate respective activities in other problematic zones of the nation, in particular, on its south-western borders, as well as in Volyn, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kherson Provinces and on the territory of the occupied Crimea.

24. How to inform about ATO. SBU recommendations. [Еlectronic resource]. - Access : https://getpocket.com/a/read/980808171


 *Information about the author:

Gnatyuk Sergei, Ph.D., history, Chief Consultant, office of information security and information society development, National Institute for Strategic Studies

The article has been prepared on the basis of address to the International Conference “Civilizational War of Russia against Ukraine and the West: Outlook and Informational Dimension”.

04.04.2017 23:00:00